A Lens Through Which to View Geopolitics: The Democracy of it All

Nicholas Migli

After forty years of the Cold War and thirty years of American unchallenged dominance, many Westerners have, and naturally so, begun to view the world in very simplified terms. We tend to view states under authoritarian rule as being monolithic, serving only the interests of a single leader and reducing their decision-making processes to the wishes of a single person.

This, however, is untrue and deceptive, causing us to simplify the world we live in and ignore important complexities as it relates to geopolitics in the 21st century. Whether they be totalitarian states or communists, all have diverging internal interests and require compromise among elites that make for a much more multiplex environment than typically assumed. The importance of Western policy makers understanding the intricacies of internal power sharing in foreign countries, especially those states that the United States competes with for the global share of power, cannot be understated. The unique circumstances and interests of individuals among the elite, and the population at large shape the overarching interests of the entire nation and therefore guiding the path forged by those peoples. To only consider the interests of one would be to ignore the other half of the equation.

The aim of this article is to offer a few examples, both historical and current, that challenge a simplified worldview and to propose a deeper understanding of democratic functions that exist in undemocratic states.

People’s Republic of China:

For nearly 75 years, China has been ruled solely by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This system of governance allows for no direct participation of the people in the electing of their leaders and to most outside viewers, appears to function as a dictatorship. At the macro level, while not without merit, this view degrades the agency and democratic functions that do exist in China and causes us to simplify our understanding of the internal functions of the nation.

A recent and important example of the limited democratic functions of the people in China was the recent anti zero-Covid protests that reversed a championed policy of Xi Jinping himself. Protests of this scale are uncommon in China but displayed the inability of the CCP to simply quash popular sentiment inside their borders, so long as it does not directly challenge the power of the party. Had the CCP continued with its unpopular policy, the threat of serious unrest combined with anger over other issues may have threatened to spread in an uncontrollable fashion. As such, the Chinese people were able to exercise limited collective bargaining at a national level through street demonstrations. These nationwide protests managed to achieve a limited political goal but that in and of itself is remarkable considering the widely held belief that the Chinese people are simply victims of their circumstances.

Again, there is some truth to this as in recent years, the CCP has become excessively overbearing in everyday life, but the real story is much more complex. It has been a long-standing policy of the CCP, called the Chinese social contract, to provide significant improvement in the quality of life for ordinary citizens in return for its monopoly on power. This does not totally exclude the notion of protests though; in fact, the CCP has long allowed limited organized protests to exist as a way to police provincial officials. In 2011 villagers in Wukan, China carried out protests against land seizures by officials and successfully negotiated some of their terms and grievances. There a plenty of other examples of this exact same phenomena occurring in China and they display some of the democratic powers the Chinese people do retain under their one-party rule. At the end of the day, the CCP cannot unilaterally impose decisions without first, directly or indirectly, consulting the will of the people.

Inside the party, there is a term that exists which best describes the sharing of factional power among the CCP known as interparty politics. This term has been used to describe the interparty democracy among the CCP elites and the term has even had support from within the CCP itself, once being a staple of party advertising to the Chinese people and the world at large. It is simply an official recognition of the factionalism that exists in all governments, even in that of an outwardly unified communist party, and one that has existed throughout the entirety of the CCP’s reign over China. Though this may have been officially curbed by Xi Jinping and his emphasis on a unified party, factions and power sharing still exist today and do not simply dissolve overnight, even in the most austere of environments. It existed under Mao, and it continues to exist today.

North Korea:

Considered by many to be the world’s most reclusive society, North Korea maintains a system of governance light years away from democracy as we know it. Often, its leader Kim Jong-un, is described as unpredictable and dangerous. This though, has been the way the West has described North Korea for over thirty years, and yet it’s clear the North has developed a strategy for dealing with its adversaries that is obviously more complicated and long-term than one man.

Donju is a term in the North used to describe a class of individuals and families known as “money masters”. These donju play an important role in supplementing the states income and closed market system, often operating “illegal” black markets and providing finances for both individuals as well as the state. In economic policy, this North Korean entrepreneurial class wields outsized influence on the direction the Kim regime takes and due to their connections, do not shy from engaging directly with the leader himself. This perspective of reality is far from the Kim-dominated theory that is most often represented in accounts on North Korea. If Kim were to destroy this class of capitalists (who are technically committing crimes daily), he would lose much-needed funding that only the outside world can provide. Though not quite like going to the voting booth and casting a ballot, the power dynamic in North Korea is clearly not as one-dimensional as many outside observers may believe.

Then there is also the class of political elites in North Korea. Questions have existed for some time about just how stable Kim’s position is as the leader of North Korea and some of the ruling elites may wield serious power that challenges that of the Kim family in the political system, as suggested in Daniel Tudor and James Pearson’s North Korea Confidential. Though confirming anything regarding the political power structure inside the shadows of North Korea is extremely difficult, some form of power-sharing clearly exists and complicates the status quo formula for dealing with North Korea.

Russia:

The final state examined will be that of Russia. As we all know, President Putin and the Russian military launched a massive attack on Ukraine in 2022 (though the conflict has been ongoing for much longer) that took the world by surprise. Many foreign officials and media declared that Putin had “gone mad”. A drastic oversimplification and incorrect analysis of Putin, this seemed to suggest that the decision was his and his alone, and that he had done this without the support of the Russian population at large. Unfortunately, this is simply not true.

If the Russian population had opposed the war, Putin would never have been able to launch his full-scale assault on the Ukrainian people as he did in 2022. While Putin’s calculation of Western solidarity, or lack thereof, may have been misguided, his assessment of the Russian people seems to have been correct. As recently as November 2023, polling done in Russia continues to show high levels of support for their country's continued military action in Ukraine, despite the costs both in economy as well as human life. And the margins are staggering considering the circumstances: 73 percent reportedly support the ongoing war perpetrated by the Russian government and this is nothing to scoff at. For reference, just two years after the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, American support for the war had fallen to 47 percent and only 55 percent believed America should keep troops in Iraq until the country had stabilized.

In addition, it is not clear that the Russians would be willing to negotiate for peace if that meant returning seized Ukrainian land back to the Ukrainians. In May of 2023, 62 percent of those polled in Russia said they would oppose ending the war if it meant returning territory seized since 2014.

I say all of that to say this: without public support, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine would have never happened and would not continue. Though Russia has a very poorly functioning democratic system that does not necessarily define the will of the Russian people, Putin and the government keep their finger on the pulse of the Russians and are mindful of sentiments among the populace. Neither holds absolute power and each must constantly be aware of the interests of the other. As moods among the population change, so too will that of the Russian government and American diplomats and negotiators must understand this relationship.

Conclusion:

Though not all systems are strictly democratic in nature, nor representative of a population’s interests at large, it remains vital for policy makers in the West to understand the nuances of the authoritarian and totalitarian states we engage with on a diplomatic level to avoid oversimplifying the interests of their states. Power sharing exists at both macro and micro scales. Democratic functions can and do exist in places we as Westerners, who group up in democratic systems, might not expect.

To better understand the goals of our adversaries throughout the world, we must understand their reasons for acting as they do and the forces behind those actions. Whether it be struggles within a party or dissatisfaction among the people. These democratic functions often act as limits on a ruler’s power and restrict how far they may go in any given situation. We must understand what these limits are to more realistically set our own goals and engage the world in a more educated and concentrated manner, rather than treating the actions of one leader as only their own.

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