Over the past several years, American intellectuals and politicians have been wielding a new term to describe the relationship China has with the United States and the Western world: the Thucydides’ trap. This term, now widely accepted as fact in the US, describes the rise of China and its challenge to the US as the world’s sole superpower as inevitably leading to armed conflict and war. It would be difficult to find an American policy maker who disagrees with the premise or at the least, does not use it. However, the names and concepts we assign to relations between countries have real, tangible impact and inevitably lead us to think in ways that are in agreement with the assigned title. In this case, the potential consequences are immeasurable and a slight misstep by either power could result in devastation for much of the world’s population and economy. It is important to understand that not only is the relationship between the US and China not a Thucydides’ Trap, but that the term itself is irresponsible and risks causing policy makers to sleepwalk the US into conflict with one of the world’s largest military powers.
The language we use and metaphors we assign to everyday life shape the way we think and in turn, the actions we take. Metaphors have stories and emotions behind them and are important in connecting one thing to another in our daily lives. When we use metaphors, we subconsciously draw connections in our brain that leave a lasting impression and when applied to novel ideas, they have the potential to forever alter the way we think about them. “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable.” This famous quote from Thucydides regarding the Peloponnesian War, while interesting to consider, is flawed in its application to the current situation. In a now rather prevalent book by Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, a review of sixteen rising versus ruling rivalries found that twelve of them ended in conflict. While at first glance this may sound disheartening, that means fundamentally that the four conflicts that avoided war were not Thucydides’ Traps. Examining these relationships from the present looking back gives us important lessons in responsibly managing relations with other states, but would it have been appropriate for a contemporary of that time to prematurely label the relationships as Thucydides’ Traps? Had that been the accepted reality, might that have changed the outcome? Would leaders of the different states have made different decisions because their foundational view of the other was rooted in the idea that conflict is inevitable? I believe the answer in at least some of these relationships is that it certainly could have impacted the outcome. The application of this concept prior to the conclusion of events almost certainly would have soured relations and caused tensions that may not have been there before. It is important we do not philosophize ourselves into a war we do not want to fight.
When we examine the current relationship between the US and China, it is important to understand the many off ramps and roadblocks to conflict that exist on both sides. The most important of these is the economic situation. Both countries are economically dependent on one another and serious disruption of trade between the US and China as well as trade that flows through the South China Sea would bring serious economic hardships to both nations, not to mention the rest of the world. This alone is enough to force serious considerations from both sides before making any unilateral moves to change the status quo. On the side of China, it is also important to consider the problems domestically that would likely hinder military moves on their end. Whether its military corruption in the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, continued problems in the Chinese property market, or slowdowns in Chinese economic growth and youth employment, President Xi Jinping has realistic complications as it relates to serious military action that would bring China into conflict with the US. All of these issues hinder inevitable conflict and many others offer realistic protections against conflict between the world’s largest militaries. Without such a close relationship over the past thirty years, conflict would certainly be more likely. But the fact of the matter is that Chinese aggression is constrained by its economic relationship with the world, and the US is in turn constrained by the impact a war with China would have on itself and the rest of the world. Would then the US and China really be in Thucydides’ Trap, or is this another case of great power competition, a much more appropriate title, and one that can be responsibly managed as the competition it is, not the inevitable war it has been predicted to become.
The shift towards a new understanding of China, though small, has already started to take shape. The Biden administration recently changed decoupling to de-risking as it recognized the dangers in pushing China into a corner on its own with policy to match the new term. “Hide your strength, bide your time, never take the lead.” For the past three decades, this has largely been the policy of the Chinese Communist Party following Deng Xiaoping’s free market reforms and opening up in China. It was suitable to a China that was comparatively weak and in need of serious reform. Today however, China has become a serious player on the international stage and as such, President Xi has taken China in a direction more fitting to his interpretation of its stature as China has grown. In order to more responsibly manage this new China, the US must understand what its goals as well as capabilities are, and decide how to best keep competition from turning to war. It starts with the metaphors we use and the policy directions they take us in.
